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Divergence via Europeanisation: Rethinking the origins of the Portuguese Debt 
Crisis 
Abstract: A founding myth of the euro was that profound economic convergence could be 
achieved across the core and periphery of Europe. Scholarship from within Comparative 
Political Economy (CPE) has compellingly pointed to this myth of convergence as the 
fundamental mistake of the euro project.1 Economic and Monetary Union was applied across 
a range of incompatible varieties of capitalism with little appreciation for how difficult it would 
be for peripheral economies to overcome long standing institutional stickiness. Yet, while 
institutional stickiness tells us much about the causes of declining competitiveness, it tells us 
much less about the origins of brand new patterns of debt-led growth. This article modifies 
this CPE account by drawing attention to the much overlooked case of Portugal. In contrast to 
CPE’s emphasis on institutional stickiness, this paper explores the ways in which negotiation 
of European integration has been generative of institutional transformation leading to debt-
led growth in Portugal. By combining Europeanisation with CPE, this article shows that, far 
from an inability to do so, in the case of Portugal, it has been the attempt to ‘follow the rules’ 
of European Integration that explains its damaging patterns of debt-led growth. 
Keywords: Eurozone Crisis; Europeanisation; Comparative Political Economy; Periphery; 
Portugal 
 
Introduction 
The notion that projects of economic convergence were not promoted efficaciously enough 
by the European Union or its member states resonates throughout numerous strands of 
opinion on the eurozone crisis.  This article develops a competing interpretation. By tracing 
the much overlooked case of the Portuguese economic crisis, I show how existing attempts 
at the promotion of economic convergence by European and Portuguese elites, at their most 
successful, were generative of unanticipated patterns of divergence. National and EU elites 
alike have tended to subscribe to a common sense belief that European integration would 
lead to processes of economic convergence among member states.2 As Hall notes, an 
‘element of prophecy was built into this mythology’ which remained, of course, unfulfilled.3   
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I outline this rethinking of the crisis in Portugal over three main sections. In the first 
section I show how the literature on Comparative Political Economy (CPE) emphasises the 
role of institutional stickiness as a central cause of the eurozone crisis. It sheds light on a 
foundational inequality in European integration. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was 
applied across a range of incompatible varieties of capitalism with little appreciation for how 
difficult it would be for peripheral economies such as Portugal to overcome long standing 
peripheral trajectories of economic development.  
Section two takes this argument further by proposing the need to recognise that 
economic divergence can be caused just as much by institutional transformation as it can by 
institutional stickiness. I draw on Europeanisation theory to show that while a focus on 
institutional path dependency under EMU can tell us much that is useful about the specifics 
of Portugal’s economic divergence with core EMU, CPE, especially Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC), tells us very little about institutional transformation leading to debt-led growth.  
Section three takes this framework and outlines how EU projects of convergence 
became generative of divergence via institutional transformation. I trace Portugal’s 
Europeanisation, and show how the Portuguese variety of capitalism did not simply persist 
following EMU. Rather, Europeanisation of banking and finance during the 1980s and 1990s 
transformed the Portuguese economy into a brand new and unanticipated debt-led growth 
regime, leaving the economy in a particularly vulnerable position upon entering EMU.  
The key contribution of this paper is the drawing together of literature from CPE and 
Europeanisation to show that accounts of the crisis in the European periphery are incomplete 
without taking account of both institutional stickiness and institutional transformation as 
components of economic divergence. Recognising this leads to the central claim of this article: 
it was as much Portugal’s attempt to ‘follow the rules’ of European Integration, as its failure 
or inability to, that explains its current difficulties. 
   
Institutional Stickiness: Comparative Political Economy and the Portuguese 
Crisis 
A founding myth of the euro was that all member states could and should converge with each 
other. On the one hand, as set out in the Maastricht Treaty’s ‘convergence criteria’, it was 
anticipated that the stringent conditions imposed by the EU on member states would force 
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structural reform and lead to convergence of inflation levels, convergence of government 
deficit and debt levels relative to GDP, exchange rate stability culminating in a single shared 
currency, and interest rate stability. The Delors report on EMU even made it clear that the 
success of the euro depended, inter alia, on ‘[g]reater convergence of economic 
performance’.4 On the other hand, for the so-called peripheral countries, convergence was 
also suggestive of more profound growth-rate and per capita income convergence with 
Western Europe, as well as an (unproblematised and often vaguely defined) project of 
modernisation and development.5 Participating in the euro and the Single Market tended to 
be viewed by the periphery as a ‘challenge for development’6 wherein Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal could each leave their ‘peripheral’ pasts behind and converge, in terms of their 
competitiveness, levels and forms of economic development, with their advanced Western 
European neighbours. As the late former Prime Minister and President of Portugal Mário 
Soares put it in a 1985 interview with Le Monde:  
‘No if we did not want to miss out on the end-of-the-century technological revolution, 
we absolutely had to join Europe. Now is the time!’7  
Of course, the problems facing such visions of convergence were infamous even 
before the crisis hit. This first section shows how convergence in terms of competitiveness 
vis-à-vis the European core was always unlikely, if not impossible for Portugal because of the 
specificities of its ‘sticky’ national institutions. To make this argument I draw on the work of 
Comparative Political Economy (CPE) scholars such as Alison Johnston, Bob Hancké, and 
others to explore the causes of Portugal’s declining competitiveness under EMU.8 In doing so 
I establish the central role of institutional path dependency (‘stickiness’) in CPE accounts of 
the eurozone crisis. 
The Institutional Roots of the Portuguese Crisis 
The story of Portugal’s economic crisis is perhaps less well-known than that of its fellow 
beleaguered peripheral European countries.9 After a decade of stagnant growth and in the 
context of a broader eurozone crisis, Portugal applied for a €78 billion euro bailout from the 
EU and IMF in April 2011. Portugal’s path to crisis differs in important ways from the rest of 
the periphery. Several divergences are worth noting initially. First, in stark contrast to the 
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overheating of the Irish and Spanish economies during EMU membership, Portugal 
experienced anaemic rates of growth (see figure 1).10  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Second, figure 2 shows that Portugal failed to converge in terms of GDP per capita with either 
its euro area partners, or its fellow so-called ‘cohesion countries’.11 
 [Insert Figure 2 here] 
Third, Portugal certainly had fiscal problems. It first breached the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) in 2001 and consistently ran large fiscal deficits throughout the 2000s, yet its public 
debt to GDP ratios tended to be around 10 per cent over that of Germany, never approaching 
Greek proportions (see figure 3). 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Fourth, as figure 4 shows, Portugal began to experience a widening current account deficit 
much earlier than the other peripheral countries. As early as 1995, Portugal’s current account 
deficit began to widen dramatically, which sets it very much apart, not just from Germany, 
but from Spain, Greece, and Italy.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
A Comparative Political Economy (CPE) approach can shed light on Portugal’s particular path 
to crisis.  Although broad and diverse, CPE approaches to the study of the eurozone crisis can 
be argued to make three central observations.12  First, national institutions matter: different 
institutional configurations of EMU member states produce different economic capacities and 
problems, develop over long periods of time and are ‘sticky’ or path dependent.13 Second, 
EMU advantaged the institutional configurations of the core and disadvantaged those of the 
periphery in various ways. Third, core EMU countries have certain non-price competitive 
advantages over peripheral countries. I briefly elaborate on each observation by drawing on 
the work of Hancké, Johnston, Jones and others, and by relating them to the case of Portugal. 
First, CPE approaches focus primarily on identifying the specificities of wage 
bargaining systems wherein peripheral economies such as Portugal diverge in important ways 
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from the EMU core. Portugal has a specific history of institution building, associated with the 
Southern European Mixed Market Economy (MME) variety of capitalism, which sets it apart 
from the Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) of 
core Europe.14 As Höpner and Lutter put it, given the ‘stickiness’ of wage bargaining systems 
which have been ‘established over many decades, with coordinated wage systems being 
particularly difficult to emulate’ - the German case is a ‘relic of a historical stroke of 
luck’.15Interestingly, in the case of Portugal, Royo and others observe strong corporatist 
tendencies.16 It is worth noting that during the 1980s, centre-right governments set up 
systems of social dialogue and concertation at the macro level and succeeded in establishing 
the Standing Committee for Social Concertation (CPCS) which was enabled social dialogue at 
the national level between Trade Union confederations, Employers’ Associations and the 
state. The CPCS has led to the signing of several tripartite agreements and has made it 
possible, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, for successive governments to ensure public 
support for wage bargains linked to important macroeconomic goals such as accession to the 
EEC and membership of the euro.17 
However, Royo and others also note that this corporatist style system is marked by 
the twin legacies of Portugal’s recent authoritarian past and a polarising democratisation 
process, each of which have resulted in a lack of coordination and trust.18 The institutional 
character of post-revolution Portugal leaned towards the radical left during the late 1970s, 
but has certainly been watered down in the decades since. Nevertheless, opposition from 
trade union confederations has tended to lead Portuguese governments to abandon plans 
dealing with employers’ demands for greater flexibility on dismissals and the reduction of the 
associated costs, greater working time flexibility and lower overtime pay.19 This tends to lead 
to negotiation stalemates, especially during the 2000s, and organised labour’s political 
influence is relatively stronger than organised business.20   
Yet in many respects, trade unions in Portugal are relatively weak. Royo notes that 
since democratisation, Portugal’s trade union structure has evolved as highly fragmented and 
union membership has been in decline.21  There are no representation criteria in Portuguese 
law which effectively means that all trade unions in Portugal are considered representative, 
regardless of their actual membership levels.22 This means that employers can bypass the 
strongest unions in a workplace and instead reach agreement with the unions that may be 
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more accommodating.23 In addition, collective agreements effectively apply to all workers, 
not just those who are members of the union doing the negotiating. This lowers the incentive 
to join a trade union, as workers will benefit from agreements anyway.24 The result is a lack 
of uniform conditions nationally and significant variations in wage levels across different 
sectors.25  
The second observation recognises that such specificities of Portugal’s national 
specific institutions are by no means the whole story. Johnston and Hancké link these 
different national institutions to the design flaws of EMU.26  Johnston focuses on the link 
between different wage bargaining systems and the instability of the euro. She shows that 
whilst institutional differences long predate the euro, they became existential threats under 
EMU. As the argument goes, EMU transformed sectoral labour market governance in the 
European periphery and prompted a steady rise in the relative prices of sheltered/non-
tradeable sectors, vis-à-vis the core.27 There are three broad reasons for this. First, CMEs such 
as Germany with coordinated wage bargaining systems have the institutional resources to 
control wage growth in sheltered and non-sheltered sectors, while MMEs tend to only achieve 
some wage moderation in non-sheltered, export-oriented sectors.28 Second, Johnston 
recognises that despite this institutional asymmetry, during the 1990s, the EU provided 
political and economic costs to rising inflation across all countries. However, having joined 
the euro, the institutions and constraints no longer existed. Without these tight fiscal rules at 
the EU level national wage negotiators (especially in sheltered sectors) could allow wages to 
rise. Finally, countries like Portugal also lost important tools to manage declining 
competitiveness, such national central banks that were averse to inflation, and currency 
devaluations. MME tend to lack the institutions necessary to produce low inflation, and thus, 
ended up with higher real exchange rates and relatively declining competitiveness.29  
Reis notes that it is often cited that unit labour costs in Portugal rose almost 20 per 
cent relative to those in Germany during the period 2000-2007.30 Portugal actually achieved 
a slowdown in the growth of relative real unit labour costs after the introduction of the euro, 
yet what is important is that they still continued to rise.  Relative increases in the cost of 
labour in Portugal were not associated with higher productivity, in fact, as Blanchard notes, it 
nearly vanished.31 Blanchard notes that productivity growth in the business sector fell to 
around one per cent between 2004 and 2005 (it was three per cent in the 1990s) and Jones 
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notes that total factor productivity grinds to a halt.32 This meant that as even nominal wage 
growth decreased over the 2000s, any competitive advantage which could have been gained 
was offset by continued increase in relative labour costs and a decline in productivity 
growth.33 As the argument goes, this contributed to Portugal’s widening current account 
deficit. 
Third and finally, Nölke shows how CPE approaches can explain institutional sources 
of declining competitiveness aside from relative unit labour costs.34 CMEs or export-oriented 
economies such as Germany have an institutional advantage in building up incremental 
innovations in high-quality manufacturing, ‘based on a sophisticated system of skill formation, 
in particular through vocational training’ but also through relative job security and traditions 
in long term investment practices.35 Peripheral economies typically have more of an 
advantage in the production of low to medium quality goods which rest on a more uneven 
system of skill formation. This has a number of consequences, not least of which is the 
vulnerability to competition from emerging economies outside of the EU single market.36  
Portugal’s economy has been characterised by a historic lack of large firms, a 
predominance of SMEs, and a high prominence of low-to-medium technology manufacturing 
exports. While SMEs employ 66.5 per cent of workers in the EU 27, in Portugal the figure is 
76.9 per cent. Of these, employment is concentrated in micro firms more than it is in the rest 
of the EU (44.3 per cent and 33.5 per cent respectively).37  Although Portugal’s merchandise 
exports are now fairly diversified and its exports have moved in higher value products, during 
the 1990s and early 2000s traditional, low-technology goods featured prominently in 
Portugal’s exports. These sectors proved extremely vulnerable to international competition 
from East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe over the 1990s and 2000s.38 As the Banco de 
Portugal notes, although Portuguese exports (excluding energy) grew 5.4 per cent between 
1997-2006, market share declined -2.1 per cent over the same period.39 In particular, Portugal 
experienced declines in the “textiles, textile products, leather and footwear” sector from the 
period 1997-2006, mainly in favour of China and East Asia following the ending of the Multi-
Fibre Agreement which had placed restrictions on the quantities of textiles and clothing that 
could be exported from developing countries to developed countries. Following the 2004 EU 
enlargement, Portugal also lost market share in the export of “motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers” over the period 2002-2006, in favour of the relatively highly skilled, low wage 
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labour markets of Central and Eastern Europe.40 Portuguese exports have been traditionally 
relatively vulnerable to international competition, and as Leao and Palacio-Vera note, the 
market share of Portuguese exports in the EU15, the destination for 71 per cent of Portuguese 
exports in 2008, declined by 33 percent between 2003 and 2009.41  
Although critical of this so-called ‘competitiveness hypothesis’, Jones argues that a 
CPE account should be able to identify divergence of the periphery from the core in terms of 
five factors: an acceleration in the relative growth of unit labour costs, rising inflation, 
deceleration in productivity growth, deterioration in export performance and a deterioration 
of the current account.42 As shown, and as Jones recognises, the Portuguese case reflects 
these divergences.43 First, although Portugal experiences a slowdown in the growth of relative 
real unit labour costs after joining EMU (see figure 5), and a slowdown in the appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate, both indicators of relative cost competitiveness continue to 
worsen relative to Germany, just at a slower pace.  
[Insert figure 5 here] 
Second, domestic price inflation also worsens and labour productivity grinds to a halt. Third, 
Portugal’s labour productivity grinds to a halt during the 2000s. Fourth, Portugal’s export 
performance deteriorates between 1999 and 2007. Finally, as figure 4 shows, this all shows 
up in Portugal’s widening current account deficit. 
These five economic divergences faced by Portugal tell the story of its specific path to 
crisis. Central to the emergence of these divergences is that Portuguese institutions proved 
resistant to change in the context of EMU. Yet, compelling as this CPE account is, tracing the 
lack of institutional transformation is far from exhaustive. As I show in the following section, 
this account is incomplete, even misleading, without taking into account the role played by 
institutional transformation in the emergence of debt-led growth in the Portuguese economy. 
 
Accounting for Institutional Transformation: Europeanisation 
Focusing only on the path dependencies of the Portuguese variety of capitalism can cause us 
to overlook the real and significant institutional transformations that the Portuguese 
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economy did experience. The problem is not that institutional stickiness or EMU design flaws 
do not matter. The real problem is that perspectives emphasising this ‘perfect storm’ of sticky 
national divergences within an ‘unfit-for-purpose’ EMU problematically assume that the lack 
of institutional transformation exhausts the origins of divergence in Portugal’s political 
economy. The logic is simple - the periphery diverged because it didn’t transform. Portugal 
experienced speculative pressure in 2011 because of its competitiveness problems in the 
years before. Yet, as I show, the very distinctive form of crisis encountered by Portugal 
suggests that something is missing from this formulation.   
In this section I draw on the literature on Europeanisation to develop a new account 
of the origins of the crisis in the periphery which can complement CPE’s sensitivity to path 
dependent national varieties of capitalism under a flawed in design EMU. Bringing these two 
literatures together makes it possible to propose that the economic divergence experienced 
by Portugal involved not only institutional stickiness, but also institutional transformation. 
Portugal’s crisis is about more than a failed attempt to converge. This approach makes it 
possible to show how Portugal’s attempt to participate in projects of convergence was 
generative of processes of divergence.  
 
Disentangling ‘divergence’ from ‘institutional stickiness’ 
Focusing on the resilience of path-dependent institutions can certainly help us explain 
Portugal’s declining competitiveness under EMU, but it downplays the commensurate 
importance of institutional transformation in the generation of Portugal’s debt-led growth.44 
The key strength of CPE more generally is also its major limitation. That is its meta-theoretical 
foundations in historical institutionalism, approaches which, as Thelen notes have quite poor 
records in explaining institutional change.45 This makes a lot of sense if we consider the origins 
of the approach. It first emerged as a critique of the hyper-globalist thesis and makes the 
argument that national models of capitalism can resist transformation in the face of external 
pressure for convergence.46 Because institutions are ‘sticky’, these approaches have a strong 
tendency to emphasize continuity through time in the basic structure and logic of models of 
political economy.47 CPE scholars consequently have less to say about institutional change 
over time because as, Thelen puts it,  
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[The] idea of persistence is virtually built into the definition of an institution, it should 
perhaps not be a surprise that the question of change is a weak spot in the literature 
as a whole, and indeed across all varieties of institutionalism.48  
 
Perspectives emphasising institutional stickiness overlook the fact that simply because 
a country has ‘failed to converge’ it does not mean that ‘things have stayed the same’. Failing 
to generate competitive economic growth does not mean a simple persistence of tradition 
(i.e., emphasising the legacy not just of Portugal’s revolution, but of the authoritarian Estado 
Novo in its wage bargaining system).49 When Portugal, Greece, Ireland and others attempted 
to reform and modernise during the 1990s and 2000s, their efforts to do so resulted in 
significant and dramatic changes to their political economies, because transformation was an 
outcome of the attempt to reform and modernise. Had Greece and Portugal not attempted 
reform, they would not have transformed in quite the same way. Ultimately, a theory of 
institutional stickiness shuts down a myriad of interesting and important questions about the 
role of institutional change in generating economic divergence in these countries. 
This overlooking of institutional change can be addressed by bringing CPE into 
dialogue with the literature on Europeanisation.  Scholars of ‘Europeanisation’ study a 
country’s ‘domestic adaptation to European regional integration’.50 Bringing in this literature 
has the additional benefit of addressing certain strands of CPE’s, especially VoC’s relatively 
weak conception of the international. For the latter, external pressure will not lead to 
domestic change, it will only shed light on and confirm existing national specificities. All 
meaningful change comes from within.  
As Featherstone notes: 
Thus the approach would support hypotheses of path dependency in relation to 
external pressure and would stress the resilience of the particular market model in 
interpreting such pressures’.51  
Europeanisation on the other hand takes the possibility of domestic transformation as a result 
of adaptation to European regional integration as its starting point.  
Similar to CPE, Europeanisation literature has recognised that domestic adaptation to 
European integration is very unlikely to lead to convergence; as Radelli puts it, ‘Diversity of 
domestic responses – across countries, institutions, and policy domains – has become a key 
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theme in Europeanization research’.52 Some literature has focused on the ‘differential impact 
of European integration’.53 Existing specific domestic contexts may lead to differential results 
from the process of Europeanisation.54 Laffan sees a persistence of diversity across national 
executives rather than convergence towards a particular model.55 Although European 
directives are aimed at harmonising national policies, in reality, they leave much room for 
continued national diversity.56 
However, digging a little deeper, the different variants of Europeanisation also tend 
to be explained as institutional path dependency, or in other words, how nation states can 
account for the timing, extent and terms of their adaptation to European integration. Radaelli 
notes that Europeanisation is sometimes measured in four ways (specifically in this case, 
Radaelli looks at European nations states adaptation to EMU – but the four criteria are widely 
used).57   The first is accommodation, which indicates a pre-existing closeness of fit (i.e. 
Germany). The second is transformation, indicating lack of fit, but leading to fundamental 
challenges to existing domestic structures. Third is inertia, indicating a lack of change due to 
lack of fit and deeply entrenched domestic institutional veto players. Finally there is 
retrenchment, which indicates a paradox of negative Europeanisation.  
Much like CPE, most research on Europeanisation and the European periphery tends 
to focus on inertia. This is perhaps because, as of yet, not enough attention has been paid to 
how transformation due to ‘lack of fit’ is much more likely to lead to divergence/institutional 
transformation, rather than convergence. When convergence fails to occur, researchers tend 
to focus on obstacles to that convergence – leading them to identify institutional, cultural, 
and political obstacles. Indeed, in cautioning against using the concept of Europeanisation as 
‘yet another way to refer to convergence and homogeneity in Europe’, Radaelli and Pasquier 
recommend that ‘the prediction to test is about lack of convergence, not its presence’.58 Much 
recent scholarship on Europeanisation therefore emerges as a critique of earlier studies in 
the field which tended to expect convergence as a result of domestic adaptation to European 
integration. Framing their positions in this way has led them to emphasise the 
resilience/persistence of national differences just as VoC scholarship tends to.59   
However, as I show in the next section, there is an implicit third option available within 
the Europeanisation framework: the possibility that domestic adaptation to European 
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integration can lead to profound institutional transformation of existing domestic structures. 
It is possible to conceive of Europeanisation leading to the emergence of radically new hybrid 
domestic structures and patterns of growth. Divergence is conceptualised here as more than 
the resilience of national differences. It is (at the same time) the possibility of the emergence 
of entirely new kinds of national differences. Combining CPE with a Europeanisation 
framework makes it possible to show that the European project did not simply fail to manage 
a diverse range of varieties of capitalism. It is actively implicated in generating brand new 
patterns of fragility through transforming existing varieties, over time, into something new.  
 
Europeanisation, Divergence and debt-led growth in Portugal 
Dramatic institutional transformations occurred in Portugal during the 1990s and 2000s which 
cannot be captured by mere ‘persistence’ or continuations of existing trajectories. Rather, 
‘when Europe hit home’, it led Portugal’s economic development in new and unexpected 
directions. Recognising the possibility of Europeanisation being generative of divergence 
addresses both the limitations of the CPE approach – as it allows for the possibility of 
institutional change, and recognises the international (in this case European) constituents of 
domestic institutional development. This section comprises of two parts. First, I show how 
Portugal’s adaptation to EU driven reforms relating to banking and finance contributed to 
institutional transformation leading to increasing private indebtedness. Second, I show how 
a rejuvenated banking sector damaged Portugal’s competitiveness through overheating 
particular sectors of the Portuguese economy.60 
 
Europeanisation and increasing private indebtedness 
Portugal’s economy experienced dramatic, accelerated transformation during the 1990s.61 In 
stark contrast to the stagnant growth that was to follow, during the 1990s Portugal was 
among the top three fastest growing economies in the EU.62 Yet, its economy was being 
reshaped along precarious lines, largely as a result of reforms relating to the process of joining 
the single market and EMU. Particularly in banking and finance, reforms took place in terms 
of liberalisation of regulatory frameworks, privatisation and the freeing of international 
capital movements.63 What emerged was, as the European Commission puts it, a ‘very 
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competitive and innovative market highly suitable for absorbing the rapid increase in credit 
demand’.64 
In its integration with Europe, Portugal committed to a reform agenda underscored 
by privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation. Up until this point, the Portuguese banking 
system was tightly controlled.65 The legacy of the revolution and the 1976 constitution meant 
that banking and finance in Portugal was characterised by stringent controls, ‘constitutionally 
irreversible’ nationalisations, and state intervention. From the mid-1980s onwards, key 
reforms were implemented that reversed this. In 1984 the banking system was opened to 
private, foreign and domestic entry for the first time since the revolution.66  Following 
accession, there was a wide-ranging overhaul of the financial system propelled by various EU 
banking directives and other measures.67 Among the most important were the EU’s Second 
Banking Directive of 1993, the EU’s Capital Adequacy Directive (91/121/EEC), as well as 
Directives on the components of banks’ capital (89/299/EEC), on the BIS solvency ratio 
(89/647/EEC) and on consolidated supervision (89/30/EEC).68 The rate for compulsory 
reserves in the Banco de Portugal fell from 17 per cent in 1989 to 2 per cent in 1994 in line 
with European practice.69 Portuguese banks’ could now take on more risk, access new sources 
of financing and sell new products. Interest rates were deregulated, credit ceilings were 
abolished and open-market operations. All restrictions in consumer credit were abolished in 
1995 (albeit this was comparatively late) following the completion of the Single Market. 
Privatisations also played an important role in this changing landscape.70 By the 1990s, as a 
result of adhering to the requirements from the EC/EU, the financial system in Portugal had 
completely transformed.71  
Credit fuelled consumer spending became a significant driver of economic growth 
during the 1990s. Household indebtedness was well above the euro area average of 80 per 
cent and Credit growth accelerated (in real terms) from close to 0% in 1990 to above 25% in 
1998.72 Lagoa et al. note that private consumption was responsible for 70 per cent of GDP 
growth in the period, gross fixed capital formation for 36 per cent, and public consumption 
for 21 per cent.73 Portugal experienced a surge of investment during the 1990s and this would 
not have been possible without the wide availability of credit made possible by deepening 
European integration74, and the concomitant liberalisation and deregulation of the banking 
sector during this period.  Indeed, Portugal experienced profound convergence of borrowing 
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costs both after joining the euro which drove the institutional transformation of Portugal 
during this period, increasing private and public indebtedness. Similar to the rest of the 
periphery, interest rates plummeted and with the absence of exchange rate risk, between 
2000 and 2008 Portugal had access to a cheap pool of debt, in the form of long term bonds 
and notes.75  
The favourable conditions associated with the prospect of joining the euro 
encouraged households to increase their borrowing at such high rates – namely disinflation, 
lower nominal and real interest rates, and rapidly rising income levels.76 Similarly, the 
structural reforms relating to the banking sector ensured that there was a wide supply of 
credit to meet consumer demand, and the liberalisation of the credit market helped foster a 
strongly competitive environment where banks were eager to meet the growing borrowing 
demands.77 In these different ways, EU reforms are strongly implicated in the transformation 
of Portugal into a ‘debt-led domestic demand’ model of economic growth during the 1990s.78  
 
Linking debt-led growth to economic stagnation 
We can also understand the role of European financial liberalisation and integration as a 
catalyst of the slowdown discussed in section 1.79 Portugal’s nominal ‘convergence’ with 
Europe since the 1980s had been premised on the inflation of domestic demand. Once this 
dropped, the economy accordingly stagnated.80 Thus, we can link debt-led growth to 
Portugal’s economic downturn in the following ways. 
First, in addition to increasing indebtedness, this trajectory of credit-fuelled economic 
growth contributed to the expansion of particular sectors of the Portuguese economy. The 
incentives provided by the structural reforms geared investment and capital inflows to the 
newly profitable non-tradable sectors, including construction, retail and privatised utilities, 
which were less exposed to foreign competition.81 A key example of this is the construction 
sector, which during the 1990s, grew at four times the rate of the rest of the economy.82  
These sectors were in turn financed through the pivotal role of the newly invigorated, 
liberalised and privatised banking sector. At the beginning of the 1990s 40 per cent of bank 
loans to non-financial firms went to manufacturing firms and this declined to 20 per cent in 
the 2000s.83 However, the percentage of the construction and real estate sectors in total 
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business debt rose from 10 per cent in 1992 to almost 40 per cent in 2008.84   As a result of 
lower interest rates, an increased credit supply, and growing bank competition to direct a 
surge in capital flows into the non-tradable sector, macroeconomic imbalances grew.85 This 
contributed to the stagnation in the 2000s as the construction sector saw its share in value 
added as a percentage of GDP fall from 7.6 percent to 6.6 percent, in stark contrast with 
Ireland and Spain.86 In fact, Portugal was the only European country to register an annual 
decline in investment in construction every single year since 2002 until 2011.87 As such, while 
the loss in market share for Portuguese exports played a role in the stagnation of the 2000s, 
the context of Portugal’s declining export competitiveness is linked to the growth and decline 
of these non-productive inward looking sectors.  
During the 1990s, non-tradable sectors, where productivity lagged, attracted far more 
investment from banking and finance than the vulnerable manufacturing sector.88 As 
manufacturing became perceived as higher risk due to its exposure to international 
competition, newly privatised and liberalised banks began to direct credit to real estate, 
construction, and other non-tradable activities.89 As such, Portugal’s declining 
competitiveness has two interrelated facets. As manufacturing became increasingly 
threatened, the inward looking non-tradable sector grew, intensifying declining 
competitiveness and widening current account deficits. 
Portugal’s adaptation to the Single Market and EMU contributed to institutional 
transformation and divergence in Portugal during the 1990s. Portugal’s downturn has its 
origins in the path dependencies discussed in section one. But these path dependencies 
cannot fully explain the emergence of credit led growth of the 1990s. This aspect of Portugal’s 
crisis is best accounted for by focusing on Europeanisation driven institutional 
transformation. During the 1990s, the banking sector in Portugal appears to have been 
relatively more vigorous in fuelling credit led growth than it was in Ireland and Greece at the 
same time (see figure 4).90 This is important, because Portuguese consumers were 
overleveraged and reassessed their incomes at the same moment they joined the euro. This, 
as well as a falling confidence in the Portuguese economy contributed to a marked decline in 
consumption.91 As figures 6 and 7 show, Portugal’s private indebtedness diverged with the 
rest of the EMU both during the 1990s and 2000s. 
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[Insert Figures 6 and 7 here] 
High private indebtedness at the end of the 1990s contributed to stagnant growth 
rates in a number of other ways. Portuguese non-financial firms had a tendency to favour 
debt financing over equity financing during the 1990s, partially due to the availability of cheap 
credit leading to high corporate leverage. This further damaged Portuguese growth by the 
2000s.92 As the IMF notes, ‘excess leverage may …have had a negative impact on investment, 
as over-indebted firms tend to pass up on new investment opportunities, particularly those 
with limited short-term benefits but higher long-term productivity gains’.93 Indeed, 
investment growth in Portugal peaked in 1997 and then gradually declined to turn negative, 
in line with increasing leverage.94 In other words, debt was so great in the corporate sector 
that it served as a barrier to accessing further debt, stalling productivity.95  
Portuguese households and firms were also especially vulnerable to ECB interest rate 
rises. The ECB raised its key interest rate from 0.25% in early 1999 to 4.5% in late 2000.96 This 
further dampened domestic demand and made public debt more expensive to service, 
leading to a breach of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) in 2001. The EDP breach 
committed Portugal to a pro-cyclical, contractionary fiscal policy, which further contributed 
to falling GDP.97  
The Portuguese crisis can thus be understood as follows. During the 1990s a process 
of institutional transformation, facilitated by the EU, contributed to the expansion of 
economic growth in the non-tradable sector via the banking and financial sectors. Secondly, 
the limits of this new model became evident in the early 2000s when declining export 
competitiveness was not counterbalanced by domestic demand led growth – because of over-
indebtedness. Tracing the transformation of the Portuguese economic trajectory has 
highlighted the importance of recognising institutional stickiness in the face of an unfit for 
purpose EMU. But it has also emphasised the pivotal role of Europeanisation of banking and 
finance. Through an attempt to prepare for the single market and the transposition of 
associated directives, banking and finance in Portugal dramatically transformed and drove 
brand new patterns of divergence, ultimately damaging economic growth.  
As a case study, Portugal illustrates the damage caused by a small, peripheral 
European economy’s attempt to pursue an agenda of economic convergence via an attempt 
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to adapt to a ‘one size fits all’ model of European integration. Bringing Europeanisation into 
dialogue with CPE makes it possible to recognise that institutional stickiness and declining 
competitiveness matter, but it is vital that Portugal’s divergence from the EMU core (and 
much of the periphery) is also generated by institutional change catalysed by Europeanisation 
leading to brand new patterns of debt-led growth. Perspectives which highlight the more 
readily apparent ‘pathological’ domestic origins of the crisis in the European periphery, should 
move towards a deeper engagement with the systemic, European level causes of the crisis 
which I have identified as pivotal. As a small country at Europe’s edge, Portugal had limited 
agency to negotiate its process of European integration. As CPE scholars such as Regan have 
recognised, while Germany has been a rule maker, countries such as Portugal are rule-takers 
in the integration process, downloading institutional reforms it had little ability to shape at 
the uploading stage.98 Membership of the Single Market and EMU was viewed by Portuguese 
political actors as ‘the only way to keep a peripheral country at the heart of the EU’s decision 
making process’.99  Portugal swiftly adopted numerous legislative changes relating to banking 
and finance, contributing to earning the country the nickname of the ‘good student’ of 
European integration.100 However, to quote Portuguese historian José Medeiros Ferreira, 
Portugal illustrates the perils of a peripheral country striving to position itself as a “good pupil 
to bad masters”.101  
Conclusion 
This article has shown that Portugal’s path to crisis was, to an important extent, catalysed by 
its attempt to participate in a project of European convergence. Rather than focusing on the 
ways in which EMU was disastrously incapable of handling the resilience of particular varieties 
of capitalism which were ill-suited to EMU, I have shown that the real ‘design flaw’ was the 
promotion of a specific project of convergence relating, specifically to banking and finance. 
Implementing a ‘one size fits all’ project of economic convergence across uneven levels and 
types of economies was always unlikely to produce homogeneity of models.102 Yet, this article 
has developed a different critique of the integration process. I have shown that, in the case 
of Portugal at least, the attempt to mitigate these differences through some important and 
compulsory measures aimed at a specific type European convergence actually contributed to 
the emergence of brand new and perilous patterns of divergence. 
19 
 
This argument echoes invitations such as the one extended by Bache, Bulmer and 
Gunay which calls for Europeanisation studies and International (or, in this case, Comparative) 
Political Economy to engage more closely with one another.103 By shedding light on how 
Europeanisation has been generative of a brand new trajectories of debt-led growth, rather 
than simply leaving existing national path dependencies behind, it has shown the real 
potential of Europeanisation studies to inform Comparative Political Economy theories of 
capitalist diversity. It by no means suggests that declining competitiveness and institutional 
stickiness do not matter. Had Portugal’s banking and finance sectors not transformed so 
dramatically, it still would have likely encountered the problems of competitiveness 
highlighted by CPE scholarship. Thus, the Europeanisation approach proposed here should be 
seen as complementing CPE in the sense that it makes it possible to account for the dual 
importance of debt-led growth and declining competitiveness in the origins of Portugal’s 
ongoing difficulties. The challenge for Portuguese and EU crisis management involves 
addressing each of these aspects.   
Similarly, this argument also points to some fruitful contributions to the literature on 
debt and the Eurozone crisis. In particular, it echoes literature which emphasises the 
differentiated and regional specificity of varieties of financialisation and debt-led growth.104 
Similar to these accounts, rather than viewing financialisation as a top down, irresistible 
structural pressure this article has emphasised the importance of national contexts, and the 
specific, bottom-up role of domestic adaptation to European integration. This suggests that 
debt-led growth can emerge in different ways across different contexts and that the specific 
form of debt-led growth which emerged is inextricable from Portugal’s particular experience 
of adapting to the ‘one market, one money’ project. As de Pinho and Soares suggest: ‘without 
the need for alignment with single market legislation, the deregulation of the banks would 
have been much slower and probably less extensive’.105 The potential significance of this point 
is that future research could analyse the intersection between national institutional contexts, 
Europeanisation, and debt-led growth through analysis of other European peripheral 
countries. 
This novel reading of the origins of the eurozone crisis has important consequences 
for how existing political responses to the eurozone crisis should be evaluated. The official EU 
response has been marked by measures designed to correct the divergences of the peripheral 
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states; to drive convergence more extensively and systematically – to prevent the periphery 
from endangering the rest of the eurozone through its failure to converge. Yet, if adaptation 
to new developments at the level of the EU is understood as central to emergence of crisis-
prone trajectories of economic development, it suggests that a lack of convergence is not the 
main problem facing the eurozone. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The relative severity of 
the crisis in the periphery can be explained by the EU’s commitment to the promotion of a 
single model of convergence across a variety of different European economic trajectories. It 
follows that any response to the Eurozone crisis will produce similar tensions unless it is 
recognised that any project of European integration is likely to produce multiple models of 
development. The challenge is not to heedlessly push for future convergence, but to envision 
ways in which virtuous patterns of divergence can be cultivated within a project of 
integration. 
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Institutional Advantage”. 
27 Johnston, “Convergence to Crisis”,22. 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid, 5. 
30 Reis, “The Portuguese Slump”. Although Reis cautions that the case of Germany is not representative. 
31 Blanchard,”Difficult Case”,7. 
32 Blanchard, “Difficult Case”,7; Jones “Competitiveness and the European Crisis”93. 
33 Blanchard, “Difficult Case”, 7. 
34 Nölke, “Economic causes”. 
35 Ibid,10. 
36 Ibid,10. 
37 Távora and González, “Labour market policy”,324. 
38 Arnold, “Boosting Economic Performance”; Corkill, The Development of the Portuguese Economy,158–64. 
39 Banco de Portugal “Portuguese Export Performance”,208 
40 Banco de Portugal “Portuguese Export Performance” 
41 Leão and Palacio-Vera, “Can Portugal Escape Stagnation?",11. 
42 Jones, “Competitiveness”,92 
43 ibid 
44 Streeck, “Re-Forming Capitalism”; Streeck and Thelen, “Beyond Continuity”; Thelen “Institutional Change”. 
45 Thelen, “Institutional Change”,473. 
46 Featherstone, “Varieties of Capitalism”. 
47 Thelen, “Institutional Change”,473. 
48 Ibid,473. 
49 Royo,”Portuguese Interest Groups”. 
50 Vink and Graziano, “New Research Agenda,”. 
51 Featherstone, “‘Varieties of Capitalism and Greece”, 32. 
                                                          
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
52 Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?,”,3; Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,”52; Börzel and 
Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,”; Heritier et al., Differential Europe; Knill et al. 
“Neglected Faces of Europeanization",519-37.  
53 Wessels, Fifteen into One?; Heritier et al., Differential Europe; Vink and Graziano, “ New Research Agenda,” 9; 
Radaelli, “Italian State and the Euro",33. 
54 Vink and Graziano, “New Research Agenda,”9. 
55 Laffan, “Core Executives,”.  
56 Vink and Graziano, “New Research Agenda,”10–11; Wessels, Fifteen into One?, xv. 
57 Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization?".  
58 Radaelli and Pasquier,39(italics added). 
59 Just as Wessels, Fifteen into One? and Heritier et al., Differential Europe do. 
60 This section draws on the discussion in Dooley, “Portugal’s Economic Crisis”.  
61 Teixeira, “Introduction",25. 
62 Figures cover the period from 1986-2000. 
63 Decressin and Mauro, “The Portuguese Banking System",5; Leão, et al., “Financialisation in the European 
Periphery",6. 
64 European Commission Occasional Paper 11,; Banco de Portugal, “The Portuguese Economy",xxi.  
65 Dooley,”Portugal’s Economic Crisis” 
66 Rodrigues et al. “Semi-Peripheral Financialisation”. 
67 See Decressin and Mauro “The Portuguese Banking System,”7 for a detailed summary of these measures. 
68 Decressin and Mauro, “The Portuguese Banking System"7–9; Dooley, “Portugal’s Economic Crisis". 
69 Rodrigues et al. “Semi-peripheral Financialisation” 
70 See Decressin and Mauro, “The Portuguese Banking System", 10 for a list of selloffs. 
71 Honohan “Consequences for Greece and Portugal”,3. The discussion of this paragraph draws on the detailed 
account of Decressin and Mauro “The Portuguese Banking System. See pages 5-10 especially. 
72 European Commission "Portuguese Economy after the Boom" 57; Lagoa et al., “The Case of Portugal,”17. 
73 Lagoa et al., “The Case of Portugal,",7. 
74 Ibid.,9. 
75 Rodrigues et al. “Semi-peripheral Financialisation” 
76 European Commission "Portuguese Economy after the Boom",57. 
77 Ibid.,58. 
78 Lagoa et al., “The Case of Portugal,”16. 
79 Banco de Portugal, “Portuguese Export Performance” 66. 
80 Dooley, “Portugal’s Economic Crisis”  
81 Rodrigues and Reis, “Asymmetries of European Integration",197. 
82 Corkill, Development of the Portuguese Economy,43. 
83 Rodrigues et al, “Semi-Peripheral Financialisation”,495. 
84 Ibid,496. 
85 IMF, Country Report,8. 
86 Reis, “The Portuguese Slump”,156. 
87 Lourtie, “Understanding Portugal”,6. 
88 Ibid. 
89  Leão, et al. “Financialisation in the European Periphery,” note, from the period 1993-2007; Decressin and 
Mauro “The Portuguese Banking System”. 
90 Lourtie, “Understanding Portugal” 
91 Cardoso, “Household Behaviour" 
92 IMF, “Country Report” 9. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Selassie, “Portugal’s Economic Crisis"5-7. 
96 Lagoa et al., “The Case of Portugal,”12. 
97 Lagoa et al., “The Case of Portugal,”12. ; Dooley, “Portugal’s Economic Crisis”. 
98 Regan, “Imbalance of Capitalisms”,6. 
99  Teixeira, “Introduction",18-19. 
100 Ibid, 18-19. 
101 I thank an anonymous reviewer for directing me towards this quotation; see Gasper, “União Europeia”.   
102 Smith, “Introduction". 
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
103 Bache et al, “Let’s get critical!”; See also Featherstone, “Varieties of Capitalism”. 
104 For instance, see Rodrigues et al. “Semi-Peripheral Financialisation” for an excellent account of Portugal; see 
also Engelen et al “Geographies of Financialisation”. 
105 De Pinho and Soares, “Single Market and Portuguese Banking”, quoted in Rodrigues et al. “Semi-Peripheral 
Financialisation”,488-489. 
